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A Derivative Security Approach to
Setting Crop Revenue  Coverage
Insurance Premiums
Jeffrey R.  Stokes
The nature  of indemnities  and  reliance  on  futures  price  averaging  during two
distinct time intervals throughout the production year imply Crop Revenue Coverage
(CRC) insurance behaves like an exotic put option. Treating this type of insurance
as  a derivative  security,  an analytical  model  is  developed  and  an algorithm  for
solving the model to place a lower bound on insurance premiums is presented. Monte
Carlo simulation, taking into account the path-dependent nature of an Asian-type
option, is then used to determine lower-bound estimates for insurance premiums on
corn gross revenue under specified price and yield distributions.
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Introduction
Production agriculture has always been inherently risky. Price and yield uncertainty
at the farm level have, in the past, seemed to justify government involvement in agri-
culture. This is so even in the long-standing presence of commodity markets which can
(and in many cases do) offer price risk protection for commodity producers. Numerous
arguments have been made to justify such continual direct government involvement in
agriculture  as managing  low farm incomes, stabilizing farm prices and supplies, and
maintaining an adequate and safe food supply (Knutson, Penn, and Boehm). Emerging
trends toward diminishing the role of the federal government in agriculture and the new
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act have made the government's
future role in the production agriculture sector uncertain.
Traditional price support programs and commodity markets have offered producers
a mechanism to manage price risk. However, with the exceptions of Multiple-Peril Crop
Insurance (MPCI) and catastrophic coverage, little or no yield risk protection has been
available through these sources. In response to this deficiency and recent government
attitudes regarding farm policy, commodity markets and private insurance companies
have become innovative in both conceiving and offering products designed to better pro-
vide risk protection for agricultural producers.  For example, in June 1995, the Chicago
Board of Trade  began trading yield futures  contracts  to  complement  its numerous
commodity price-oriented  products.
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Private insurance companies have also become more creative in terms of the types of
products they now offer agricultural producers. Companies like American Agrisurance
have been providing revenue-based insurance products designed to offer both price and
yield protection concurrently.  Gross revenue guarantees  are now available in several
states for a number of commodities.  Income  Protection,  Revenue  Assurance,  Crop
Revenue Coverage (CRC), and Crop Revenue Coverage Plus are four such revenue-based
insurance policies  offered by private insurance companies.
The CRC product is especially noteworthy as it appears  to have gained widespread
acceptance from producers. However, current procedures to determine premium prices
for CRC (for example, those suggested by Barnaby) are confusing and ad hoc in nature.
Although it is not altogether clear why, crops that can be covered withMPCI have CRC
premium rates that are closely linked to MPCI rates. Such approaches to setting CRC
rates can have serious consequences  if the inaccuracy  or mispricing  induced by these
current procedures is large.  Additionally, sellers of income-based insurance products
may have limited understanding of the complexity of the derivative securities they are
marketing.
Given the potential for mispricing, the consequences could be large for taxpayers as
a whole because  CRC insurance  providers  apply for reinsurance through the federal
government. Underpricing and/or inadequate hedging of  the risk the insurance company
assumes may have the undesirable  effect of forcing the government back into a more
proactive agricultural role if  a farm crisis ensues and a crop insurance industry bailout
becomes  necessary.  Similarly,  the  threat  of  overpricing  may  result  in  even  more
government regulation of the private crop insurance market. In either case, there is the
potential for increased  government  involvement in agriculture,  albeit indirectly, but
nonetheless in opposition to the current retreat.
The objective of  this research is to present an equilibrium framework from which CRC
insurance  premiums can be  approximated that is more closely  aligned with contem-
porary economic and financial theory.  To accomplish this objective,  CRC insurance is
discussed in detail and  a derivative  security  pricing methodology  is suggested  as a
means  of setting a lower  bound on  CRC insurance  premiums.  In this discussion,  it
becomes apparent that CRC insurance  behaves like an Asian put option. An analytic
solution to the model is shown to be extremely complex because of the dependency of the
policy on at least two path-dependent  state variables. As a simple empirical example
and practical alternative,  CRC insurance premium approximations are generated for
Iowa corn using Monte Carlo simulation under some basic assumptions regarding the
underlying  diffusion equations  for price  and yield  of corn.  Finally,  these results are
summarized and conclusions  are drawn.
Crop Revenue  Coverage
Crop Revenue Coverage is a Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) approved alter-
native to Multiple-Peril  Crop Insurance.  Piloted in the spring of 1996, more than one-
third of Iowa and Nebraska corn and soybean producers  transferred MPCI policies to
CRC. In the fall of 1996, the FCIC [now the Risk Management Agency (RMA)] approved
expansion of CRC for wheat producers with plans to further expand into other crops and
geographic  areas.  In 1997,  a total  of 166,896  policies were sold in 18 states for corn,
cotton, grain sorghum, soybeans, and wheat (FCIC).
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CRC policies insure that the gross revenue per acre associated with a particular
commodity grown by a producer will fall within some range of possible outcomes. The
insurance essentially works in the following manner.1 On or before the sales closing
date, producers determine the crops for which they desire insurance, and for what level
of coverage.2 Coverage levels range from 50% to 75% in 5% increments. The producer's
gross revenue is determined in all cases by the product of prices and yields. However,
two types of yields, and prices from two different time periods, determine (a) whether
an indemnity is necessary and, if so, (b) how much indemnity is necessary.
Both a base price and a harvest price are used to determine indemnities. For example,
the base price for corn is calculated as 95% of the average daily settlement price on the
December corn futures contract traded at the Chicago Board of Trade during February
of the production year for which coverage is desired. Similarly, the harvest price for corn
is calculated as 95% of the average daily settlement price on the December corn futures
contract traded at the Chicago Board of Trade during November of the production year
for which coverage is desired.
The two types of crop yield on which CRC policies are dependent are actual produc-
tion history (APH) and actual realized yields. APH is an average of the producer's own
personal yield history, while actual realized yields are for the cropping year covered by
the insurance. The existence of an indemnity is based on whether or not actual realized
gross revenue is in excess of guaranteed gross revenues. Actual realized gross revenue
is determined by multiplying the calculated harvest price by actual harvest time yields.
Guaranteed gross revenue is determined by multiplying the greater of base price and
harvest price by the coverage level and APH yield. In this sense, the indemnity offers
a three-tiered  payoff because  the  producer receives  nothing if actual gross  revenue
exceeds guaranteed gross revenue or, alternatively, if actual gross revenue is less than
guaranteed gross revenue, the producer receives a payoff equal to the difference between
actual and guaranteed gross revenue. In this last case, guaranteed  gross revenue will
be determined with the greater of base and harvest prices.
Given the preceding  discussion regarding the key variables and events that trigger
a CRC insurance indemnity, at the end of the  production year (or more generally,  at
termination time T), the following mathematical expression describes the setting:
(1)  V(T)  = max{0, yby  - hy(T), min{y(b  + C)y  - hy(Y),  h[yy  -y(T)]}}.
Here, V represents the time T value of the CRC insurance contract in dollars per acre,
max is the maximization operator, y denotes the guarantee (in percentage terms), b and
h are the base and harvest prices in dollars per bushel, y represents the APH yield per
acre, y(T) is the producer's actual realized yield per acre, and r denotes the price limit
in dollars per bushel. Thus equation (1) describes the conditions under which an indem-
nity will not be paid (in which case V = 0), or the conditions under which an indemnity
will be paid (V > 0).
1Interested readers  desiring more detailed information  should consult Harwood  et al., or (for example) American Agri-
surance's  online web site (http://www.amag.com).
2 The sales closing date varies by geographic area and refers to the date at which coverage must be obtained to be eligible
for indemnities.
StokesJournal  ofAgricultural and  Resource Economics
In mathematical terms, equation (1) is a boundary condition for a partial differential
equation (PDE), the solution of which is the value of the CRC insurance contract.3 This
interpretation presupposes that CRC insurance can be treated as a derivative security.
To confirm this, consider that producers buying the insurance for a given commodity are
in  effect buying a European  put option  on the  gross revenue  associated with  their
production of that commodity.  In the case of many commodities  covered by CRC, this
feature-in conjunction  with the policy's  fundamental  reliance  on futures  contracts
publicly traded at regional exchanges-implies the insurance derives its value from the
value of other (underlying) assets.
In fact,  all income protection policies  operate very much like options or, more gen-
erally, derivative  securities (Stokes, Nayda, and English; Turvey  1992a, b; Turvey and
Amanor-Boadu).  In the majority  of the cases, a threshold level of income per acre, for
which the insurance  is purchased, is specified.  Failure to achieve this threshold level
usually  results in an indemnity equal  to the difference  between actual  and insured
income.  Given these types of insurance  products can be viewed as put-like derivative
securities, then a logical first approach to premium approximation is the application of
contemporary  derivative security pricing techniques.
However,  as noted above, CRC imposes  some rather complex conditions that deter-
mine whether an indemnity will be paid. Because a producer could only purchase CRC
before  yields  and the harvest  price  were known  with  certainty,  there  are multiple
sources of uncertainty that must be priced to accurately set premiums.4 Additionally,
CRC is also classified as an exotic or path-dependent derivative  because of the nature
of the construction of base and harvest prices. That is, the value of the CRC contract
depends on the history of futures prices (through the constructions of base and harvest
prices) rather than just on their value at T. These ideas are developed more fully in the
next section.
Asian Options and Implications for
Crop Revenue  Coverage
Numerous research efforts have been directed at developing pricing models for options.
The  majority  of this research  has  centered  on analytic  and  numerical  solutions  to
European-  and American-type  options.  (Interested  readers  should  consult Rogers
and Talay,  or Dempster and Pliska for contemporary  treatises on the current state of
development of modern option pricing theory and practice.)  Exotic or path-dependent
derivative securities typically pose substantial valuation problems stemming from their
complexity. An analytic solution to a PDE derived to characterize the value of an exotic
derivative is a rare occurrence, with most valuation attempts ending in numerical
solutions to the PDE or simulation.
Of critical interest for the valuation of CRC insurance is the recognition that this type
of insurance is a complex form of an Asian option,  a special kind of exotic option. The
term "Asian" in this context denotes that such options originated for stocks trading on
3  Two examples of PDEs for CRC insurance are presented in the appendix to demonstrate the derivations of the PDEs and,
by way of example, to highlight the complexity of the equations.
4 Furthermore,  a producer may not know the base price in part or in full, depending  on the time that CRC is purchased.
For example, in a given production year, if corn CRC is purchased before  the last day of February or, alternatively, if corn
CRC premiums are set before the last day of February, then the base price is also stochastic.
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Asian exchanges  (Campbell, Lo,  and MacKinlay).  All exotic options have  payoffs that
depend in some nontrivial way on the past history of the underlying asset price as well
as its spot price at exercise or expiry (Wilmott, Howison, and Dewynne).
Asian options are fully path-dependent and typically depend on some form of average
of the underlying asset or exercise  prices  over one  or more time intervals while the
option is alive. Averaging can be discrete or continuous, as well as geometric or arith-
metic. The link to CRC insurance for exchange-traded commodities should be clear. The
value of the insurance  is critically dependent  on base  and harvest prices  which are
averages determined by the evolution of the futures price. However, harvest price is not
known at the sales  closing  date  or any time prior to the purchase  of the insurance.
Similarly, while base price may be known by the sales closing date, it may not be known
(in full or in part) at the time the producer buys the coverage or the time the rates are
set. Because futures prices are an ongoing revelation, and base and harvest prices are
averages of futures prices, the path-dependent nature of CRC is established.
As mentioned previously, different types of averaging can take place. In the context
of CRC insurance, discrete arithmetic averaging is used to build the base and harvest
prices by using the settlement prices for each day during the appropriate intervals. This
type of averaging is typical  of many derivative  securities, but is atypical in that the
underlying asset price portion of the payoff (harvest price)  in addition to the exercise
portion (base price) is being averaged.5 Usually, either the asset price or the exercise is
averaged, but not both. Nonetheless, this type of averaging does allow one to get close
to a solution when using an analytic approach to valuation (under some special assump-
tions), and offers an algorithm to employ if a numerical solution is satisfactory.
An Algorithm for Determining Crop
Revenue  Coverage  Premiums
An analytic derivative security modeling approach  to approximating  CRC insurance
premiums  commences  as would any other approach to valuing a derivative  security.
Namely, the underlying state variables influencing the value of the derivative need to
be identified  and their diffusion  equations  specified. Depending  on the nature of the
state variables modeled (e.g., whether their risk can be hedged), equilibrium and/or arbi-
trage approaches can be employed to arrive at a PDE, the solution of which describes
the value of the derivative  or, alternatively,  the premium  for the insurance.  In most
cases, path dependency precludes a closed-form solution for the value of exotic options.
Numerical methods are, however, fully capable of enumerating option values by numer-
ically solving the PDE given appropriate boundary data.
CRC insurance for exchange-traded  commodities is fundamentally dependent on five
stochastic state variables: the futures price of the underlying commodity (f), the yield
of the underlying commodity (y), the base price (b), the harvest price (h), and time (t).
Time dependence  exists for all the state variables, but is intentionally suppressed to
facilitate notational convenience.  For example, we write f  to mean f(t). The insurance
5Technically, further averaging is at work because APH yield is also an (annual) average and is part of the exercise portion
of the payoff. For simplicity,  we ignore this averaging and treat APH as a parameter-recognizing  a more complex model
would account for annual sampling of producer yields.
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functional is denoted V = V(f, y, b, h, t), and is taken to mean the value or lower-bound
premium estimate  a crop producer  should be willing to pay for CRC-type insurance
coverage. Alternatively,  V represents a lower-bound premium estimate that the insur-
ance  company  should charge for a given level  of coverage.  If the assumptions  of the
model hold, this is also the actuarially fair premium.
The difficulty in applying contemporary derivative security pricing methods is readily
apparent because the PDE characterizing the insurance is multidimensional.  Such is
always the case when dealing with PDEs, but usually only one state variable and time
make up the multidimensional nature of the equation. In the present case, however, four
state variables in addition to time influence the value of the insurance policy.
One method of simplifying the problem is to recognize that b and h are arithmetic
averages where the sampling takes place at discrete points in time, i.e., at daily settle-
ment during the months when base price and harvest price are being determined.  In
between these sampling points, the value of the insurance  is influenced  by price  and
yield evolution and time passage, but cannot be impacted by a changing base or harvest
price because  these state variables  change  only when updating the running  sum  of
prices during the specified intervals.
Define B and H to be the discretely sampled running sums of base and harvest prices,
respectively,  during the time interval when base  and harvest prices are determined.
Then we can write
j(t)  k(t)
(2)  B(t)  =  f(t i)  and  H(t)  =  f(ti),
i=l  i=l
where the ti are the sampling dates, andj(t) and k(t) are the largest integers such that
tj(t),  tk(t) < t. Time dependence has been reintroduced explicitly in the equations in (2) for
improved  clarity.  Thus  the  discretely  sampled  arithmetic  averages  are given  by
B(t)/j(t) and H(t)l/k(t). The equations in (2) merely define the two time intervals when
running sums of futures prices are needed to determine base and harvest prices.
One additional piece of information is needed to complete the simplification-namely,
a jump condition. Across a sampling date, a running sum is necessarily discontinuous.
For example, the running sum of harvest price is H(ti-) just prior to a given sampling
date (ti), and is H(ti ) +  f(ti)  just after the sampling date. It is desirable from an analytic
standpoint  to have  the value of the insurance  continuous  across  sampling dates,
implying the following relations must hold during the base and harvest price estimation
intervals:
(3)  V(f, y, B, H, t)  = V(f, y, B  + f,  H,  t  ),
and
V(f, y, B, H, t)  = V(f, y, B, H  + f,  ti).
The arithmetic averaging procedure  influences the valuation process to the extent
that the B and H state variables are effectively reduced to parameters on either side of
a sampling date. Provided the conditions in equation (3) are applied when necessary to
jump the sampling date,  finding a solution is greatly facilitated  because the dimen-
sionality of the problem has been reduced twofold.
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With these thoughts in mind, an algorithm for determining the value of CRC insur-
ance for any exchange-traded  commodity is summarized in the six steps below.
STEP  1.  Beginning at expiry when the value of the insurance is known and equal to
the boundary condition in equation (1),  solve the PDE characterizing the value
of the derivative  from expiry back to the moment in time just after the last
sampling date using equation (1)  as boundary or final data.6
STEP 2.  Apply equation (3) to allow for the jump across the sampling date.
STEP 3.  Return to step 1, and solve the PDE characterizing the value of the derivative
using the equation resulting from the application  of the jump  condition as
final data.  The solution  gives the value  of the insurance  over the interval
between the sampling dates when the running sum (H) is constant.
STEP 4.  Repeat step 2 to jump the sampling date. Continue the process, stepping back
through the harvest price  estimation interval by solving the PDE  charac-
terizing the value of the derivative in an iterative fashion subject to the final
data provided by the subsequent sampling date.
STEP 5.  Over the time interval between the last sampling date for the base price and
the first sampling date for the harvest price, solve the PDE characterizing the
value of the derivative using as final data the value of the insurance just prior
to the first sampling date for the determination  of the harvest price.
STEP 6.  If necessary,  progress through the base price time interval in an analogous
manner to arrive at the time-zero value of the insurance.
Having reduced the dimensionality of the PDE characterizing the value of the deriva-
tive from five to three state variables through the use of discrete arithmetic averaging
and the use of the algorithm presented, a reasonable analytic solution is probably still
elusive for at least two reasons. First, the PDE characterizing the value of the derivative
is still quite difficult to solve analytically, especially given the three-tiered nature of the
boundary data presented  in equation  (1)  and the potential existence  of cross-partial
terms induced by price and yield correlation.
More importantly, such analytical solutions only hold for a small portion of the time
domain. The nature of the insurance (with two lengthy averaging intervals) and itera-
tive-type solution procedure ensures the existence of a cumbersome analytic expression
because the PDE must be  solved numerous times.  CRC for corn, for example,  would
potentially involve solving the PDE about 59 times-one time for each day in November
(during the harvest price determination  period), once more between base and harvest
price averaging intervals, and one time for each day in February (during the base price
determination period).
Fortunately,  two alternative  approaches  are readily available. The PDE charac-
terizing the value of the derivative can be solved numerically using explicit, implicit, or
Crank-Nicolson finite differencing schemes in the iterative fashion described. A second
approach, and the one used here and almost exclusively by Wall Street to value exotic
6  For an example of such a PDE, see equation (A5) in the appendix.
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options, is to conduct a Monte Carlo experiment where the average payoff (across repli-
cations) is determined and interpreted as the value of the derivative or, alternatively,
the lower-bound premium estimate the insurance company should charge for coverage.
Whether using a numerical procedure to solve the PDE characterizing the value of the
derivative or to simulate the most likely outcome, the functional form of the diffusion
equations for the underlying state variables  must be  specified.  In the next section,  a
simple specification is described in the context of an empirical example.
Of course, the preceding  approach to premium estimation  does not account  for all
costs. Certainly the insurance company bears costs when offering a product like CRC,
such as the cost of developing, marketing, and administering such a product/program.
In addition, premiums are often grossed up or buffered slightly as an added measure of
risk protection.  It  may be possible to pass  on most, if  not all, of these  costs to the
insured. It is also likely that producers bear costs such as the dollar costs or disutility
associated with learning about their risk management alternatives and gathering the
requisite information needed to document APH yields.
While these costs are not considered in the modeling approach outlined above, at least
two  approaches  are  available  to accommodate  their existence.  First, the cost to the
insurer and/or insured could be expressed as a fixed fraction of the CRC premium. In
such  a  case, an  additional  term enters  the  PDE  characterizing  the  value  of the
derivative. This approach is indicative of a cost structure that can be fully passed on to
the producer  and increases  linearly with a producer's CRC premium. An alternative
exogenous  approach  would be  to add a fixed  amount  onto premiums  to account  for
administration  and buffering  costs.  Such loading is  often practiced  by insurance
companies and, again, is reflective of the ability to pass these costs on to the insured. In
this case, however, the cost is equally divided among those demanding insurance. Both
of these  approaches  are beyond the scope of the present research, but the preceding
discussion demonstrates at least two ways whereby the issue of transactions costs could
be accommodated in the present framework.
Additional considerations include the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard,
as these risks are very real problems in the insurance industry and are not well
addressed in the present approach to premium approximation. This consequence is due
more to the design of CRC than to the pricing methodology itself. The effects of moral
hazard are tempered somewhat through the use of APH yields because the decision to
exhibit moral hazard this year carries with it implications  for the subsequent years'
APH yield estimation (APH is a moving average). At best, however, producers probably
are forced into making a conscientious effort to evaluate the potential monetary gains
associated with exhibiting moral hazard rather than the more desirable alternative  of
eliminating moral hazard altogether.
The problem of adverse selection is a double-edged sword. If premiums were based on
county- or state-level yield averages, the potential for a separating equilibrium exists
(Rasmusen). Those producers who can always obtain regionalized yield averages would
not see any benefit from coverage and would elect to forego purchasing the insurance.
In contrast,  those  producers incapable  of achieving  the regionalized  yield  averages
would  opt to  purchase  the insurance.  However,  the occurrence  of adverse  selection
can be mitigated somewhat through the use of a producer's own yields when setting
premiums.
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Iowa Corn CRC Premiums via Monte
Carlo Simulation: An Empirical Example
Boyle first demonstrated that Monte Carlo simulation could be used to price options,
and the technique works well on both American and European options (Gemmill). Many
options without an early exercise  feature are  complex enough that the technique  is
currently the only reasonable solution method available in practical settings (Campbell,
Lo,  and MacKinlay).  Such is the case for many  exotic derivatives,  including CRC
insurance.
The technique  is straightforward  to apply and relies on the notion that if enough
sample paths (replications) for the stochastic state variables are generated, the eventual
payoff can be determined under a variety of settings that may actually occur in the real
world.  The  average  payoff is then discounted  (at a risk-neutral  rate) back to  the
beginning of the life of the option and represents the value of the derivative or, in this
case, the minimum premium per acre the insurance company should charge for a given
level of coverage.
To employ the technique in the context of corn CRC insurance, one needs to specify
diffusion equations for corn prices and yields, and simulate a collection of sample paths.
The present value of the average payoff (indemnity) across the sample paths is then the
value of the insurance  or, alternatively, the premium. For analytic convenience, many
Monte Carlo simulations conducted to price derivative securities rely on the assumption
that the prices of the underlying assets evolve according to geometric Brownian motion
(GBM).  Such a specification  probably is based less on empirical  grounds and more on
analytic convenience  and intuition.  The  diffusion is particularly  easy  to work  with
analytically, which facilitates the solution of complex PDEs. Also, if the price of an asset
follows GBM, the distribution of prices is lognormal. Hence, the intuition that negative
prices  should  not result  and that  zero  should  be  an  absorbing barrier  for price  (to
preclude infinite arbitrage opportunities) is facilitated by the specification.
While GBM and the ensuant imposition of lognormality for prices and yields may not
be the most palatable assumption,  it  is justifiable in the present  context.  First, the
empirical example to follow is merely an example that demonstrates the behavior of the
model. The interpretation of CRC as a complex derivative and the valuation technique
itself are unencumbered  by distributional assumptions. Consequently,  other diffusion
equations that could more accurately characterize the evolution of prices and yields can
be specified. Such specifications are, however, beyond the scope of the present research.
Further, as pointed out by an anonymous  reviewer, county-level yield data tend to be
left-skewed  in direct  contrast  to the  right-skewness  associated  with the  lognormal
distribution. However, the use of futures contracts to some extent mitigates this concern
because yields are inferred from yield futures contract prices at a high level of aggre-
gation.
Assuming that the prices of corn futures and corn yield futures contracts  traded at
the Chicago Board of Trade can be modeled as geometric Brownian motion implies the
following diffusion equations hold:
(4)  d f .-  = pfdt + fdZf  and  d y = A 1 dt + aydZ,
f  (y  y
where the drift and volatility components  are constants.
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To account for correlation between price and yield, expected gross revenue is specified
as R = f  x y, and Ito's lemma is applied to determine the dynamics of R, giving
(5)  dR  = ydf + fdy  + dfdy.
Substituting for df and dy in equation (5)  using the equations in (4) results in the
following stochastic differential equation describing the dynamics of gross revenue per
acre:
dR
(6)  R  = pdt +  af dZf  +  oadZ .
R
Equation (6) is a two-dimensional Brownian motion with p = Uf + py +  pfyof  y.
The  solution to the risk-neutralized  representation  of equation  (6)  is used in the
Monte Carlo simulations and is presented below.7 This equation has the added advan-
tage  of accounting for price  and yield correlation explicitly through the drift term.  In
addition, the solution to the risk-neutralized futures price diffusion equation adapted
from equation (4) also must be simulated to be able to account for the determination of
base and harvest prices. The expression  R(T)/f(T)  is then used to determine  y(T)  as
needed in the boundary condition.
Assuming the no-arbitrage condition holds, and carrying forward the assumption of
risk-neutral  dynamics  [as conjectured in Cox and Ross, and detailed in Campbell, Lo,
and MacKinlay  (p. 355)] implies the following two discrete solution equations are to be
simulated:
r - A  t +  (fZf  t +  a  ZyVA
(7)  R(t  + At)  = R(t)e 
2
and
(8)  f(t +  At)  = f(t)e 
2 )  ,
where  02 = a  + y
2 + 2o  y  Pfy,  and r have been substituted for  i in accordance with the
assumption of risk neutrality. Zf and Zy are normally distributed random variables with
mean zero and unit variance,  and determine the direction of travel for the simulated
Brownian motion. Additionally, daily time steps are assumed; thus At is equal to 1/365.
Equations (7) and (8) are merely the discretized versions of the continuous form of the
solutions to one- and two-dimensional geometric Brownian motion found by employing
the well-known transformation-i.e.,  xR  = ln(R), and Xf  = ln(f).
7 Wholesale  substitutions of the risk-free rate of return  for the drift coefficient  can occur  when no  arbitrage prevails,
implying all the risk associated with the derivative can be hedged away. Technically, one does not make these substitutions
literally,  but rather  would  proceed  by  finding an equivalent  probability measure  under which  the  state variables  are
martingales.  As outlined  in Cox and Ross, the  solution equations  (7) and  (8) would then result.  If yield futures  are an
imperfect means  of hedging the yield risk of CRC insurance,  an alternative  is to factor basis into the analysis. If no yield
and/or price futures are available, or the basis is inadequate, the equilibrium-based PDE presented at the end of the appendix
[equation (A7)] or a variant can be used.
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Price and Yield Data
Futures price data for the 1996 December corn futures contract and the 1996 December
Iowa corn yield futures contract were used to estimate price and yield volatility and the
correlation  coefficient.  The procedure  for estimating the parameters  of the diffusion
equations is based on that suggested by Nowman under the special case of GBM (a
nested specification).
The estimation results in annualized volatility estimates of 25.2327% for the futures
price of corn, 19.5961% for the yield futures, and -0.0829  for the correlation between
price and yield. Using the yield futures prices gives the market's perception of Iowa corn
yields (after adjusting for the dollar denomination of the contract) on a daily basis for
the year  1996, and implies hedging yield risk can be  adequately accomplished using
these yield futures. Thinly traded yield futures that are more aggregate in scope may
be problematic for the hedging approach to valuation illustrated here. Longer price and
yield series and a more localized yield series could also be used to reflect wider swings
and more realistic prices and yields, but for demonstration purposes, it is felt the series
chosen is adequate. The risk-free rate of return was estimated using daily Center for
Research  in Security  Prices  (CRSP) data  on U.S. Treasury  bills  for the year  1996,
resulting in a 5.84% annualized return. Additionally, a limit upward price movement
for corn is given as $1.50 per bushel.
Empirical  Results
The Monte Carlo experiment consisted of 20,000 replications of equations  (7) and (8).
Equations (7) and (8) are simulated on a daily basis, and equation (8) is used to deter-
mine the b and h for each replication over the appropriate time intervals. Equation (7)
is used to determine y(T)  via the expression R(T)/f(T)  =  y(T).  Subsequently,  V(T)  in
equation (1)  is estimated for each replication using the simulated b, h, and y(T)  data.
Then, each simulated  V(T)  is discounted back to time zero (assumed for simplicity to
be January  1),  and all the V(0)  are averaged  to give the value of the CRC insurance
policy on that date.
A cross-section of simulated premiums (in dollars per acre) under alternative guar-
antee and APH yield levels is presented in table  1 to help convey information  about
the nature of the value of CRC insurance  under the present modeling  approach.  As
noted above, the premiums listed have been estimated for January 1, reflecting a sales
closing date, premium setting date, or CRC purchase date preior  hato  partial or full revela-
tion of the base price. 8 As shown, premiums are generally an increasing function of the
guarantee percentage  and APH yield.  This is reasonable because both the guarantee
8 To clarify,  the assumption that time zero  is January  1 implies that the mean premiums reported are for a date when
neither the base price nor the harvest price has been revealed partially or in full. Although January 1 is chosen as a matter
of simplicity, the selection does highlight the flexibility of the modeling approach by allowing for premiums to be calculated
when there are two averaging periods (i.e., before base price or harvest price are determined). Presumably, premiums could
be set or a producer could elect to purchase CRC insurance later than January 1, possibly during the month of February (after
the base price is partially revealed but before the harvest price is at all revealed),  or after the month of February (after the
base price  is fully revealed but before  the harvest price  is at all revealed).  There  is no universal advantage  to doing  so,
however. Of course, some of the uncertainty (base price) associated with the problem is resolved after February, but unantici-
pated events in February could make purchase in January less costly in retrospect.
StokesJournal  of Agricultural  and Resource Economics
Table 1.  Mean Simulated and Actual CRC Premiums, in Dollars per  Acre, for
Alternative APH Yields and Guarantee Percentages for Iowa Corn
Guarantee  Percentage APH Yield
(bushels/acre)  50%  55%  60%  65%  70%  75%
----------------------  ($ per acre) ----------------------
60  p simulated  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.08  0.14
actual  6.25  7.40  8.79  10.69  13.72  18.10
70  p simulated  0.01  0.03  0.08  0.16  0.29  0.51
actual  6.32  7.48  8.90  10.88  13.92  18.34
80  p simulated  0.05  0.12  0.24  0.47  0.84  1.39
actual  5.84  6.91  8.28  10.11  12.98  17.21
90  p simulated  0.14  0.31  0.64  1.16  1.97  3.12
actual  6.57  7.78  9.31  11.38  14.60  19.36
100  p simulated  0.34  0.73  1.39  2.43  3.93  6.00
actual  6.36  7.33  8.92  10.91  13.79  18.53
110  p simulated  0.73  1.48  2.69  4.49  6.99  10.24
actual  6.99  8.06  9.81  12.01  15.17  20.38
120  p simulated  1.39  2.69  4.69  7.52  11.26  16.02
actual  6.58  7.84  9.46  11.55  14.88  19.73
130  p simulated  2.43  4.49  7.52  11.62  16.91  23.43
actual  7.13  8.49  10.25  12.51  16.12  21.38
140  p simulated  3.93  6.99  11.26  16.91  23.98  32.49
actual  6.89  8.29  9.88  12.24  15.80  21.03
150  p simulated  6.00  10.24  16.02  23.43  32.49  43.08
actual  7.04  8.03  9.93  12.40  15.86  21.44
160  p simulated  8.66  14.32  21.82  31.18  42.33  55.09
actual  7.51  8.57  10.59  13.22  16.92  22.87
170  p simulated  11.98  19.28  28.66  40.11  53.41  68.37
actual  7.36  8.70  10.83  12.95  16.80  22.70
180  p simulated  16.02  25.11  36.55  50.13  65.62  82.80
actual  7.79  9.21  11.47  13.71  17.79  24.04
Notes: For each APH yield and guarantee percentage combination, the top entry (p simulated)
is the mean simulated premium price per acre; the lower entry (actual) is the actual premium
price per acre for Boone County, Iowa, which was randomly selected as a representative Iowa
county. Simulated premiums are for an assumed date of January 1, implying the base price is
unknown and must also be simulated. A base price of $2.59/bushel, a low price factor of $0.217/
bushel,  and a high price  factor of $0.212/bushel  were used to estimate the actual premiums
reported.
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percentage  and APH  yield  have the  effect  of increasing the  "exercise price"  of the
insurance.  More concisely, increasing the guarantee percentage and/or the APH yield
increases the probability of an indemnity, ceteris paribus. Consequently, the insurance
is offered for a higher price.
While not directly comparable owing to differences in modeling technique,  distribu-
tional assumptions, and aggregation, corresponding  actual CRC premiums for Boone
County, Iowa, are also reported in table 1. (Boone County was randomly selected as a
representative  Iowa  county.)  These  rates  were determined  by  applying  procedures
currently in use where price, yield, and revenue  risks are all priced individually and
summed to determine the CRC premium in dollars per acre.9 As shown, actual CRC
premiums are also a strictly increasing function of the guarantee percentage, but they
are only  generally  an increasing  function  of APH.  Further,  premiums  are  always
positive and considerably  lower than those predicted by the model  developed in this
study for high APH-guarantee  combinations.
Actual CRC premiums, then, appear to be less sensitive to APH than simulated rates.
This finding is further substantiated by the results reported in table 2. Presented in
table 2 are simulated CRC rates assuming time zero is March 1, the first full day when
base price is known with certainty. The base price for corn in 1997 was $2.59 per bushel,
and this value was used in the simulations.  For comparative  purposes, table  2 also
provides the actual CRC rates for Boone County, Iowa, under the same assumptions. As
shown, simulated  and actual CRC rates are  an increasing function  of the percentage
guarantee, although it appears that actual CRC rates are much larger but less sensitive
to changes in the guarantee percentage (for a fixed APH) than are the simulated CRC
rates. Additionally, actual CRC rates are a decreasing function of APH, while simulated
rates are an increasing function of APH.
Arguably,  the differences  in distributional  assumptions and levels  of aggregation
cause at least a portion of the differences in empirical results presented in tables 1 and
2.  However,  the most  likely reason for these  differences  was  cited  above  as  one  of
the motivations for the development of alternative  premium-setting models. Current
procedures used to determine CRC premiums are closely linked to MPCI rates. When
constructing CRC premiums, both yield and price risk are determined using MPCI base
premium rates (revenue risk is determined by CRC rate factors). MPCI base premium
rates are a decreasing function  of APH consistent with the notion that at the county
level, differences in the production practices, soil fertility, rainfall, etc., associated with
individual farms in that county are relatively smaller than at higher levels of aggre-
gation.  Findings  suggest  that  producers  with  higher  APHs  demonstrate  superior
managerial ability and consequently less risk than producers in the same county with
lower APHs. This result is less likely to hold at higher levels of aggregation because
differences  in APH  at the state level are more likely to be influenced  by those very
factors cited above that tend to exhibit relatively small differences at the county level.
It  should be noted that these results do not imply that under current rate-setting
procedures,  producers with high APHs  pay less than producers with low APHs for a
given guarantee level. Recall that premiums in dollars per acre are generally an increas-
ing function of APH under current rate-setting procedures. However, it does appear that
9 Data used to construct these premiums were taken from the FCIC-RMA Actuarial  Document online  web site at
http://act.fcic.usda.gov/actdoc/.
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Table 2.  Mean  Simulated  and Actual  CRC Rates (Premium/Liability)  for
Alternative APH Yields and Guarantee Percentages for Iowa Corn
Guarantee Percentage
APH Yield
(bushels/acre)  50%  55%  60%  65%  70%  75%
------------------  ($Premium/$Liability)  ------------------
60  w simulated  0.0000
actual  0.0804
70  w simulated  0.0001
actual  0.0698
80  w simulated  0.0004
actual  0.0563
90  w simulated  0.0012
actual  0.0563
100  w simulated  0.0026
actual  0.0491
110  w simulated  0.0053
actual  0.0491
120  w simulated  0.0093
actual  0.0423
130  w simulated  0.0151
actual  0.0423
140  w simulated  0.0229
actual  0.0380
150  w simulated  0.0328
actual  0.0363
160  wsimulated  0.0447
actual  0.0363
170  w simulated  0.0585
actual  0.0334
180  W  simulated  0.0743
actual  0.0334
0.0001  0.0002  0.0004  0.0007  0.0012
0.0866  0.0943  0.1058  0.1261  0.1553
0.0003  0.0007  0.0013  0.0023  0.0038
0.0750  0.0818  0.0923  0.1097  0.1349
0.0010  0.0019  0.0035  0.0060  0.0093
0.0607  0.0666  0.0751  0.0895  0.1107
0.0024  0.0046  0.0079  0.0126  0.0187
0.0607  0.0666  0.0751  0.0895  0.1107
0.0053  0.0093  0.0151  0.0229  0.0328
0.0514  0.0574  0.0648  0.0761  0.0954
0.0098  0.0165  0.0257  0.0373  0.0514
0.0514  0.0574  0.0648  0.0761  0.0954
0.0165  0.0266  0.0397  0.0556  0.0743
0.0458  0.0508  0.0572  0.0684  0.0847
0.0257  0.0397  0.0571  0.0776  0.1007
0.0458  0.0508  0.0572  0.0684  0.0847
0.0373  0.0556  0.0776  0.1026  0.1300
0.0416  0.0454  0.0519  0.0622  0.0773
0.0514  0.0743  0.1007  0.1300  0.1613
0.0376  0.0426  0.0491  0.0583  0.0736
0.0678  0.0951  0.1260  0.1592  0.1935
0.0376  0.0426  0.0491  0.0583  0.0736
0.0862  0.1180  0.1528  0.1891  0.2260
0.0359  0.0410  0.0453  0.0545  0.0687
0.1063  0.1423  0.1805  0.2195  0.2582
0.0359  0.0410  0.0453  0.0545  0.0687
Notes: For each APH yield and guarantee percentage combination, the top entry (w simulated)
is the mean simulated rate; the lower entry (actual) is the actual rate for Boone County, Iowa,
which was randomly selected as a representative  Iowa county. Assuming a March  1 date for
premium price estimation, the base price is known and set equal to $2.59/bushel, with a low
price factor of $0.217/bushel, and a high price factor of $0.212/bushel.  All rates were deter-
mined by dividing the premium (in dollars) by dollars of liability (APH times guarantee per-
centage times CRC base price).
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in a given county, producers with higher APHs pay less in relative terms (premium dol-
lars per unit of liability) than their counterparts with lower APHs. One explanation for
this finding is that another government farm program (MPCI) imposes such a structure.
In addition,  low APH and/or low guarantees typically  imply "free" coverage,  while
high APH and/or high guarantees imply excessively high premiums for coverage under
the Monte Carlo valuation technique. If accurate, low levels of coverage  should never
be purchased by producers  because the value of the policy is, for all intents and pur-
poses, zero. Similarly, most producers probably would be reluctant to pay the excessively
high prices associated with high levels of coverage in the absence of a subsidy or cost-
sharing arrangement to induce them to do so. It  is likely that at least two potentially
related issues cause these phenomena-volatility and the GBM assumption. An under-
statement of the volatility of yields can cause low or no value for low exercise  prices
because the random draws have too little variance to make these extremes  a reality.
Likewise, if the distributions of prices and/or yields are conditionally heteroskedastic
or follow  some other fat-tailed  distribution, underpricing  at the extremes  can occur
again because of  the relatively lower probability in the tail of the lognormal distribution.
Finally, no administrative costs have been accounted for which would have the effect of
raising the simulated premiums.
Summary and Conclusions
Governmental  retreat from the agricultural sector has been met with innovative and
timely products by exchanges and insurance companies to help producers manage risk.
The newness and complexity of many of these products make evaluation by sellers and
buyers of the products potentially ad hoc. The purpose of this study was to present one
approach that can be used to set premiums on Crop Revenue Coverage, one of the more
complex insurance products.
After noting the similarities between  this product and Asian options, an analytic
approach  to  premium  approximation  was  described.  The  Monte  Carlo  simulation
method  of valuation  was  determined  to offer  the practitioner  an approach  toward
valuation  of this type of insurance. Numerical estimates of premiums  for corn  Crop
Revenue Coverage were presented as an empirical example under alternative guarantee
percentages  and actual production history yields.
Future research should proceed along three lines. First, CRC premiums and/or rates
should be analyzed under alternative  diffusion equations  after a thorough empirical
analysis of state- and/or county-level yields and prices (depending  on the level  of
aggregation desired for rate setting). While the theoretical model and methodological
approach outlined here are independent of any particular distributional assumption, it
is clear that CRC insurance premiums are critically influenced by distributional choice.
Therefore, in practice, attention should be paid to the proper selection of diffusion rather
than the simplifying assumption used in this analysis.
If yield futures contracts are inadequate for properly hedging the yield risk that CRC
insurance is designed to protect against, and/or the valuation of CRC for commodities
without a price and/or yield futures contract is desired, then alternatives to the hedging
arguments  in this research need  to be considered.  Equilibrium arguments  centered
around returns associated with other derivatives whose value is fundamentally depen-
dent on the same set or subset of state variables as CRC may be of great benefit in this
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regard. An alternative approach for CRC on commodities with exchange-traded prices
and yields is to incorporate basis as the link between the individual's yield expectations
and the market's perception of yield at a more aggregate level. Methods for incorpor-
ating administrative  and/or transactions type costs into the valuation framework and
more explicit consideration of the impacts of moral hazard and adverse selection are also
desirable.
Last, the consequences of costly reinsurance if underpricing or price gouging occurs
need to  be examined in detail. Distinct differences  in premium  prices between those
reported here and those charged by insurance  companies are most likely attributable
to methodological differences in distributional assumptions, the level of price and yield
correlation,  and  linkages  between  existing  programs  like  MPCI.  The  emergence  of
products  such as CRC in recent years is in direct response to government retreat from
production agriculture.  However, because  of reinsurance, the government potentially
can be forced  back into a proactive  role  in agriculture if mispricing occurs at a level
where insurance companies are inadequately hedged against the risk they are assuming
or if they excessively overprice  these products.
[Received March 1999; final revision received July 1999.]
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Appendix:
An Example Partial Differential Equation (PDE)
for CRC Insurance
Here, an example PDE characterizing the value of CRC insurance is derived assuming the risk associ-
ated with the derivative can be fully hedged. The derivation is expository in nature with its purpose
meant to convey a sense of the complexity of the equation characterizing the value of the CRC derivative
as well as the complexity of the derivative itself.
Assuming the price (f)  and yield (y), stochastic state variable dynamics  are described by diffusion
equations of the form
(Al)  df = pfdt  +  ofdZf  and  dy  = ay  dt + oydZy,
where pf = lf(f, t) and  uy = ay(y, t) are drift coefficients, and of = of(f, t)  and  oy = oy(y, t)  are volatility
coefficients.  Let fy be the price of a yield futures contract,  and define y = fy/c to be the market's expec-
tation of yield implied by such a price when the conversion factor, c, is a constant. Applying Ito's lemma
toy gives dy  =  dfy/c.  Assuming fy follows a diffusion equation similar to that off in (Al) then implies
the second equation in (Al) must hold. Notice also that the diffusion specifications are distribution free,
as is the derivation that follows.
The dynamics of V, the value functional describing the price of the insurance, can be determined by
applying Ito's lemma to V. The result is
dV  aV  adV  0i  a~v d  2V  a2V dy) (A2)  dV  - dt +  d f  +  d  dy  + - df2  +  2  dfdy  +  dy2
at  af  ay  2  df 2 afay  ay
2
Notice the exclusion of base and harvest prices as stochastic state variables because of the assumption
of discrete arithmetic averaging.
A hedge portfolio, II-consisting of one CRC insurance policy, 6f sold price futures contracts, and by
sold yield futures contracts-moves according to the following equation:
(A3)  dl  = dV - fdf  - bydy.
To construct the hedge portfolio, it is assumed the underlying assets can be shorted in the amounts
specified.  Substituting (A2) into (A3) and forcing the hedge ratios to equal the partial effect on V from
changes in the price and yield state variables (i.e.,  aV/af =  6 f and aV/ay  =  by)  to eliminate randomness
results in
_2V  d
2V  d2V (A4)  dIl =  dt + - df  + 2  dfdy  +  dy  2 .
at  2  df 2 afay  ay2
The return on an amount II invested in riskless assets over a time step dt would be rlIdt, where r
is the risk-free rate of return. If the right-hand side of(A4) were larger than r  dt, then arbitrage would
take place by individuals borrowing to invest in the portfolio. Conversely, if the right-hand side of(A4)
were lower than rlldt,  arbitragers would short the portfolio, placing the proceeds in an interest-bearing
account. Either way, the right-hand side of(A4) must equal rIIdt in equilibrium. Applying this result,
substituting using the definition  of II,  and employing the diffusion equations  in (Al) results  in the
following:
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at  2  f2  ff2)  Y  y2 f  Y  a(fay
+  (  r  f  +  y  rV  =  0,
where  pfy  = pfy(f,  y,  t) measures the correlation  between price and yield. Again,  notice the PDE  in
equation (A5) relies on the assumption that prices and yields can be specified as diffusions, but it is free
from any particular distributional  assumptions for each  diffusion.
The boundary conditions for the PDE in (A5) are as follows:
(A6)  V(f,y,  T;  b, h)  = max{O,  yby  - hy,  min[y(b  +  )y  - hy, h(yy  -y)]},




V(f,y,  t; b,  h)  - O,  as  f,  y,  - +,o
where  y represents the guarantee  percentage,  C denotes the limit futures price  move,  y  is the APH
yield, and all other variables and parameters are as defined previously.
The first boundary condition is merely the time Tindemnity presented in text equation (1), while the
second represents the value of the insurance when y = 0 for any time t. Such a condition ensures that
the value of the insurance is the discounted value of the indemnity when yield expectations fall to zero.
The remaining condition simply ensures that the value of the insurance or, alternatively, the premium
that the insurance company  could charge, must approach  zero as price and/or yield expectation  get
arbitrarily high.
Two additional boundary conditions for a zero futures price are necessary and depend on the time
space. V(O, y, t; b, h) =  ybye -r(T-t) if the futures price hits zero any time prior to the first harvest price
sampling date. This is because the price of any asset should have an absorbing barrier at a price of zero
to preclude arbitrage, indicating the harvest price will be zero in this case. In the event the futures price
hits zero any time on or after the first harvest price sampling date, the first boundary condition above
is valid because the harvest price still can be nonzero in this case.
Not all commodities covered by CRC have exchange-traded prices, let alone yields. If the price and/or
yield of  the commodity covered by CRC are not traded on an exchange, the PDE describing the dynamics
of the policy still can be specified provided price and yield are adequately described by diffusion equa-
tions. The  expected value of equation (A2) is the expected  capital gain on the insurance policy. The
policy pays no intermittent cash flows to the producer or insurer, implying the expected cash flow equals
zero. The sum of expected  capital gain and cash flow equated to an equilibrium return implies that
7 a 1 2fa  y)  2  2  2
(A7)  +  Of  +  +  [2 [  V  (  pGf  a-- at  2 [  f2  Yay2  fY  fy)
+ff  (afa  + (Ayav) -HeV  = O
is the PDE which must be solved to value the coverage.  Here, 0  is an equilibrium rate of return, an
unknown parameter or coefficient function. The boundary conditions listed in equation (A5) also apply
to equation (A7) with the exception that the parameter  0 should be substituted for the risk-free rate
of return.  Additional  equilibrium  and/or  hedging arguments  must be  made  to endogenize  or  risk-
neutralize the  equilibrium rate  of return,  0.  Such  arguments are beyond  the scope  of the present
research.
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